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Abstract
In the past decade, distributed systems have rapidly evolved, from simple client/server applications in
local area networks, to Internet-scale peer-to-peer networks and large-scale cloud platforms deployed on
tens of thousands of nodes across multiple administrative domains and geographical areas. Despite of
the growing popularity and interests, designing and implementing distributed systems remains
challenging, due to their ever- increasing scales and the complexity and unpredictability of the system
executions.
Fault management strengthens the robustness and security of distributed systems, by detecting
malfunctions or violations of desired properties, diagnosing the root causes and maintaining verif iable
evidences to demonstrate the diagnosis results. While its importance is well recognized, fault
management in distributed systems, on the other hand, is notoriously difficult. To address the problem,
various mechanisms and systems have been proposed in the past few years. In this report, we present a
survey of these mechanisms and systems, and taxonomize them according to the techniques adopted
and their application domains. Based on four representative systems (Pip, Friday, PeerReview and TrInc),
we discuss various aspects of fault management, including fault detection, fault diagnosis and evidence
generation. Their strength, limitation and application domains are evaluated and compared in detail.
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Abstract
In the past decade, distributed systems have rapidly evolved, from
simple client/server applications in local area networks, to Internet-scale
peer-to-peer networks and large-scale cloud platforms deployed on tens of
thousands of nodes across multiple administrative domains and geographical areas. Despite of the growing popularity and interests, designing and
implementing distributed systems remains challenging, due to their everincreasing scales and the complexity and unpredictability of the system
executions.
Fault management strengthens the robustness and security of distributed systems, by detecting malfunctions or violations of desired properties, diagnosing the root causes and maintaining verifiable evidences to
demonstrate the diagnosis results. While its importance is well recognized, fault management in distributed systems, on the other hand, is
notoriously difficult. To address the problem, various mechanisms and
systems have been proposed in the past few years. In this report, we
present a survey of these mechanisms and systems, and taxonomize them
according to the techniques adopted and their application domains. Based
on four representative systems (Pip, Friday, PeerReview and TrInc), we
discuss various aspects of fault management, including fault detection,
fault diagnosis and evidence generation. Their strength, limitation and
application domains are evaluated and compared in detail.
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1

Introduction

In the past decade, distributed systems have been rapidly evolved, from simple client/server applications in local area networks, to large-scale cloud platforms and Internet-scale P2P systems deployed on tens of thousands of nodes
across administrative domains and geographical areas. Despite of the growing
popularity and interests, designing and implementing these systems remains
challenging, due to their ever-increasing scales as well as the complexity and
unpredictability of the system executions. For instance, participating nodes
may have heterogeneous performance and be connected by communication networks with unpredictable delays and losses; nodes may join and leave the system
arbitrarily. Moreover, distributed systems, especially those Internet-scale P2P
systems, are known to be vulnerable to security threats, where malicious adversaries may intentionally deviate the systems from their expected behaviors.
Fault management provides avenues to detect malfunctions or violations of
desired properties, and diagnose the root causes which may be bugs in system
designs and implementation or malicious behaviors from compromised nodes.
In addition, verifiable evidences are also maintained to attest the diagnosis.
It is well recognized that fault management is an integral part for developing
robust and secure distributed systems. While its importance is recognized, fault
management of distributed systems is notoriously difficult, due to the complexity
and unpredictability of target systems.
A common practice for debugging distributed systems relies on logs generated by manually inserting prinf statements at various implementation points.
Systems designers analyze the logs by inspecting them manually or with ad-hoc
application-specific programs. This approach is feasible when the scale of the
target system is small and bugs are apparent. However, with the ever-increasing
scales and the complexity of distributed systems, logs may become overwhelmingly large, which makes this approach labor-intensive and error-prone.
Over the past few years, there have been intensive research activities exploring effective and efficient automation of fault management. Various techniques
have been proposed for detecting faults in distributed systems. Based on how
the expected behavior of a target system is defined, one may check the system
against specified properties (or invariants) [22, 19, 18], its reference implementation [12], or abstract state machine [20, 14, 27]. Once the faults are detected,
one may further diagnose the system to track the root causes using deterministic replay [9, 19, 14, 27], log-based causality analysis [22, 18, 8] or statistical
inference [2, 5]. In addition, references [12, 16] also propose mechanisms, particularly in untrusted environments, for generating evidences. In this paper, we
are going to provide a survey of the mechanisms and systems proposed for fault
management of distributed systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with problem statement in Section 2, by defining faults in distributed systems and introducing
the progressing steps of fault management. Section 3 provides an taxonomy
of the mechanisms and systems proposed for fault management, according to
the techniques adopted and their application domains. We then present four
representative systems that cover different aspects of fault management: we
discuss Pip in Section 4, Friday in Section 5, PeerReview in Section 6, and
TrInc in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 reviews all the mechanisms and discusses
challenges.
3

2

Problem Statement

To scope our survey paper, we begin first with a problem statement that
provides a concise definition of the types of faults in distributed systems that
we are focusing on, followed by an overview of fault management that detects,
diagnoses and generates evidences for these faults.

2.1

Faults in Distributed Systems

Generally, system faults can be defined as the deviation from the expected
behavior of a given system, which may affect the function, performance or both
of the system. A functional fault is an incompliance to the specification of the
system’s functionality, whereas a performance fault manifests itself as abnormal
consumption of important resources. For example, failing to organize nodes in
a well-formed ring in Chord DHT [24] is a classic functional fault; high latency
for Chord lookup request is a performance fault, which may indicate bugs in
the system design or implementation.
Faults in distributed systems may result from two types of causes. In some
situations, the running environment of a distributed system is fully trusted,
i.e. all the participating nodes are trusted. In this scenario, faults are derived
from bugs in the system design, implementation or configurations. We refer to
this type of faults as software errors. On the other hand, users may have full
confidence of the system design and implementation, and the faults manifest
themselves as malicious behaviors, as a result of part of the nodes being compromised by adversaries. Compared to software errors, malicious behaviors are
more difficult to be detected, as the compromised nodes may cheat about their
behaviors and collude with each other. Moreover, the nodes not only behave
erroneously, but also fail to behave consistently when interacting with multiple
other peers (known as equivocation [6]).

2.2

Fault Management

There are two general techniques for developing robust and secure systems
against system faults. The first technique, fault tolerance, aims to tolerate either
hardware or software faults and continue the system operation with, perhaps, a
reduction in throughput or an increase in latency. Various techniques are introduced for fault tolerance, including voting-based consensus and replications. It
offers users the illusion of interacting with a single, reliable server, as exemplified
by PBFT [3], Ivy [21], SUNDR [17], and Zyzzyva [15]. The second technique,
fault management, provides users with information of existing faults as accurate
and informative as possible, to enable detection of malfunctions or violations
of desired properties, diagnosis of the root causes and maintenance of verifiable
evidences that demonstrate the diagnosis.
While fault tolerance focuses on improving the availability and reliability of
distributed systems; fault management complements it by enabling users to (1)
fix design or implementation bugs to strengthen the robustness of distributed
systems; and 2) detect and analyze malicious behaviors to minimize the impact
on the systems.
Being a challenging and rich research topic, fault management in distributed
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Figure 1: Progressing Steps of Fault Management in Distributed Systems

systems can be split into three progressing steps, i.e. fault detection, fault diagnosis and evidence generation as shown in Figure 1:
• Fault Detection: The first step is to monitor execution of a distributed
system and check the observations against its expected behaviors, which
may be encoded in the form of desired properties (or invariants), state machine model, or reference implementation. The fault is reported whenever
an deviation from the expected behavior is discovered. Instead of manual
inspection, automated processes are introduced.
• Fault Diagnosis: Once a fault is detected, additional mechanism is utilized to diagnose the system to identify the nature of the fault and track
the root causes. To enable fault diagnosis, log-based mechanisms are generally required to reproduce the fault, and generate the causality paths [4].
As the embodiment of control flows and state transitions associated with
executions, causality paths connect abstract heterogeneous components or
system state, including values of monitored variable, read/write of files,
send/receive of messages, etc. Starting from the detected fault, users can
tracking back along causality paths to the root causes.
• Evidence Generation: Evidences can be broadly defined as a set of
processed information that demonstrate the assertions drawn from fault
diagnosis. After the cause of the fault is detected, the final step provides
the evidence that convinces system administrators or other peers about
the diagnosis results. Evidences might be used for debugging purposes,
to convince software owners to make modifications accordingly. In addition, evidences enable developing accountability or reputation in sysstems
where faults may be derived from malicious behaviors. Accountability, by
itself, can reduce the incidence of certain faults. For instance, knowing malicious behaviors would be detected and recorded will certainly discourage
adversaries to compromise the system.
Generating evidences is trivial in a fully trusted environment, where the
causality path used in fault diagnosis for tracking root cause is directly
applicable to serve as the evidence. However, in an environment where
multiple adversaries may compromise the system in concert, the integrity
of the evidence must be enforced during its maintenance and validated
when it is used for demonstration.
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3

Taxonomy of Fault Management

Having presented the definition and the three progressing steps of trust management. We present a brief overview of the mechanisms and systems proposed,
and taxonomize them according to the techniques adopted and their application
domains (shown in Figure 2).
Invariant Checking
Fault Detection

Reference Implementation
Model Checking
Log-based Causality Analysis

Fault Management

Fault Diagnosis

Deterministic Replay
Statistical Inference
System Debugging

Evidence Generation

Accountability

Figure 2: Classification of Fault Management

3.1

Fault Detection

According to how the expected behavior of a distributed system is encoded,
different techniques are appliable for fault detection. Based on that, the mechanisms can be classified into three categories, i.e. invariant checking, reference
implementation, and model checking.
• Invariant Checking: The expected behavior of a distributed system is
specified as a set of desired properties (or invariant). For instance, in
Chord DHT, a desired property (well-formed ring) is that each node is
the predecessor of its successor. To check whether the properties hold,
relevant system state are acquired by inserting additional statement (e.g.
Pip [22] and P2Monitor [23]) or modifying the underlying operating system
to automatically expose them (e.g. WiDS [19] and D3S [18]).
The recorded data of system state are checked against the properties using
online assertions or offline analysis. To facilitate users expressing the properties, in some fault management systems, e.g. Pip, declarative domainspecific languages are provided.
• Reference Implementation: Given a reference implementation, users
are able to detect faults by comparing the behavior of the actual system
and the one of the reference implementation1 , as exemplified by PeerReview [12]. Once all non-deterministic events, such as read/write of files
and send/receive of messages, are recorded (i.e. fixed), the reference implementation’s behavior exhibited in deterministic replay should be identical
to the one observed in the actual system.
1 Note that, the prerequisite of applying this technique is that the behavior of the system
should be deterministic.
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• Model Checking: The complexity of distributed systems often leads to
bugs in corner cases, which can only be exposed through a particular sequence of state transitions. Model checking enables comprehensive checking that covers these corner cases. Example systems include CMC [20],
MaceMC [14], and MODIST [27].
In model checking, the behavior of a distributed system is modeled as a
state machine. Starting from an initial state, a model checker performs
exhaustive search by systematically enumerating all possible execution
paths. The target system is steered to follow each of the execution paths
to check whether it behaves correctly. Due to the state explosion problem,
the scale of the exhaustive search is limited to 15-20 steps of state transitions. Random walk is introduced as a tradeoff between exhaustiveness
and performance.

3.2

Fault Diagnosis

According to the techniques used for fault diagnosis, the mechanisms can
be classified into three categories, i.e. deterministic replay, statistical inference,
and log-based causality analysis.
• Log-based Causality Analysis: Users may insert additional statements
in the source code of a target system to expose desired system state.
For instance, Pip [22] logs path instances started from outside inputs;
XTrace [8] maintains task trees. On the other hand, D3S [18], instead
of annotating source code, modifies operating systems to allow automatic
injection of state exposers and predicate checkers. Based on the logs and
snapshots of system state, with the support of visualization tools and
query engines, users are enabled to reason about the causality paths that
traceback to the root causes.
• Deterministic Replay: At runtime, distributed systems record all nondeterministic events. Once a system fault is detected, users can perform
deterministic replay to faithfully reproduce the fault (e.g. liblog [10], Friday [9], WiDS [19], and MaceMC [14]). Diagnosis is performed by inspecting how system state progress towards the fault, similar to how GDB is
utilized for single-node applications.
To facilitate diagnosis, users are enabled to monitor events in the replayed
system based on data and control flow, leveraged by watchpoints and
breakpoints respectively. In some systems, e.g. Friday, on top of symbolic
low-level debugging, diagnosis of high-level faults, such as violation of
global distributed properties, is also supported, by enabling users to attach
arbitrary python commands to distributed watchpoints and breakpoints.
• Statistical Inference: A target system is modeled as a set of system
components, where no knowledge of the components is required (i.e. the
components are treated as black-boxes). As execution profiles, the system
state recorded at runtime are typically in the form of path instances consisting of the used system components. Data mining techniques, such as
clustering, are used to correlate the detected faults and correct executions
to determine which components are most likely to be faulty. Magpie [2]
7

and Pinpoint [5] are representative examples of the systems that adopt
such mechanism.

3.3

Evidence Generation

Based on the application domains, the mechanisms for evidence generation
can be classified into two categories, i.e. software debugging, and accountability.
• Software Debugging: When targeting software errors, as the runtime
environment is considered fully trusted, there is no need to question the
integrity of logs. The evidence generation is thus straightforward: the
causality paths that traceback to the root causes of the faults are directly applicable to serve as the evidence. Such systems include Pip [22],
D3S [18], XTrace [8], WiDS [19] and MaceMC [14].
• Accountability: Performed in totally untrusted environments, the integrity of evidences has to be enforced. Tamper-evident logs are introduced to prevent modifications on history from un-authorized peers. In
addition, equivocation, i.e. making conflicting statements to different
nodes, should also be prevented by introducing additional protocols to
allow users to compare received statements (e.g. the consistency protocol
in PeerReview [12]).
Enhanced with attestation-based trusted hardware, e.g. TrInc [16], a simplified version of Attested Append-only Memory (A2M) [6], equivocation
can be eliminated in distributed system, resulting in a significant reduction
in performance overhead.

3.4

Summary

Steps
Detection

Diagnosis
Evidence

Categories
Invariant Checking
Reference Implementation
Model Checking
Log-based Causality Analysis
Deterministic Replay
Statistical Inference
Software Debugging
Accountability

Systems
Pip [22], WiDS [19], D3S [18], P2Monitor [23]
PeerReview [12]
CMC [20], MaceMC [14], MODIST [27]
Pip [22], D3S [18], XTrace [8]
liglog [10], Friday [9], WiDS [19], MaceMC [14]
Magpie [2], Pinpoint [5]
Pip [22], D3S [18], XTrace [8], MaceMC [14]
PeerReview [12], TrInc [16]

Table 1: Taxonomy of Fault Management
In Table 1, we conclude the classification of the mechanisms and systems
according to our proposed taxonomy. It is not feasible to cover all the related
literatures in fault management of distributed systems. We are going to selectively focus on some representative ones (shown in bold in Table 1), which
include: (1) Pip, an infrastructure for comparing actual and expected behaviors
to expose faults; (2) Friday, a system for debugging distributed applications
based on deterministic replay; (3) PeerReview, a comprehensive system that
provides accountability in distributed systems; and (4) TrInc, a trusted hardware for preventing equivocations. These systems cover most of the categories
in the taxonomy.
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4

Pip: Actual Behavior against Expectations

Pip provides automatic checking of the behavior of a distributed system
against a programmer’s expectation about the system’s communication structure, timing and resource consumption. It generally targets three broad types of
users, including original developers for debugging their own system; secondary
developers for learning about an existing system; and system maintainers for
monitoring a system.

4.1

Overview

Behavior Model: Pip models application behaviors as a collection of path
instances, each of which consists of an ordered series of timestamped events
on one or more hosts. These path instances encode the causalities during the
execution of the system. Pip classifies the events into three types: i.e. tasks
– intervals of processing with a start and an end; messages – communication
between hosts or threads; and notices – strings with a timestamp which are
essentially logs entries. To illustrate, Figure 3 shows a example path instance
which reflects the execution of an http request. The behavior model adopted
in Pip is naturally suited to a wide range of distributed applications, especially
event-based applications.

Figure 1: A sample causal path from a three-tier system.
Figure 3: An Example Path Instance in Pip

Each path instance is an ordered series of timesFigure 2: Pip workflow. Shaded ovals re
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ge of distributed applications. relationship.
Tasks
Pip provides an interactive GUI environment that displays causal
outines that do significant processstructure, sets
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invalidatedwrite
pathaninstances,
and resource graphs
Expectations:
Programmers
external descripfor tasks
paths.
This
visualization
toolkit
enables
programmers
to study
ed system, tasks can correspond
to ortion
of expected program behavior. The expectations
most
of application behaviors and track back to root causes of faults. In
nes. Messages correspond to
net-aspects
take two forms: recognizers, which validate or invaliaddition, Pip stores all of the path instances in an SQL database, so that pron, locks, and timers. Notices capture
date
individual path instances, and aggregates, which asgrammers may further explore the logs using queries, to facilitate the debugging
decisions or events an application
sertsystem.
properties of sets of path instances. Pip can generate
of the target
.
initial recognizers automatically, based on recorded pro-

ograms that work together to gather,
he behavior of distributed systems.
workflow for a programmer using
cribed in more detail below.

ations: Programs linked against
rary generate events and resource

gram behavior. These generated recognizers serve as a
concise, readable description
10 of actual program behavior. Section 3 describes expectations in more detail.
Formally, a set of recognizers in Pip is a grammar,
defining valid and invalid sequences of events. In its current form, Pip allows users to define non-deterministic
finite-state machines to check a regular grammar. We
chose to define a domain-specific language for defining

4.1.4

Evidence Generation

As the runtime environment is regarded as fully trusted. Evidence generation
in Pip is straightforward. The path instances that trace to the root causes
are sufficient to demonstrate the diagnosis results, for the purpose of software
debugging.

4.2

Evaluation

According to the taxonomy presented in Section 3. Pip adopts invariant
checking for fault detection, and log-based causality analysis for fault diagnosis.
We summarize the strengths and limitations of Pip as follows:
Strengths:
• Programmers are enabled to specify expectations in a clean and declarative
language. The expectations essentially define an NFS, where checking the
validity of a path instance can be reduced to classic problem of deciding
whether a word is in a regular language. This also makes possible to
automatically generate the description of actual behaviors based on a set
of path instances.
• Pip provides APIs in its annotation library for annotating resource measurements, thus enabling programmers to reason about performance behaviors. This allows Pip to detect performance faults, in additional of
structural faults.
Limitations:
• Since the mechanism used for fault detection in Pip is based on invariant
checking, programmers have to apriori define the events and other system
state to be logged. Thus prior knowledge of the target system is presumed.
Improper settings may leads to false negatives or false positives.
• Enabled by the path instances collected at runtime, Pip uses log-based
causality analysis for fault diagnosis, it intrinsically limits the flexibility
of diagnosis, as the diagnosis largely depends on the comprehensiveness
of the logs. Logs of overwhelmingly large sizes may severely affect the
performance of the target system. On the other hand, if a certain system state needed in diagnosis is not included in the logs, modification of
annotations and fresh runs of the target system will be needed.
• Extracting path instances requires access to the source code of the target
system, which might not be always available. In addition, understanding
of the source code is critical for annotating source code. For complex
systems, this process is non-trivial, and may become erroneous.
• The behavior model adopted in Pip is based on individual path instances.
So is the fault detection mechanism. It lacks of a global perspective:
the ability of reasoning about a global condition of system state at a
given time is missing in Pip. Therefore, it is hard to check high-level
global distributed properties, such verifying properties defined for mutual
exclusion.
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5

Friday: Global Comprehension for Distributed
Replay

Unlike the prior system Pip that is primarily based on log-based analysis,
the second system Friday, adopts a different approach for fault diagnosis based
deterministic replay. Friday debugs distributed systems with low-level symbolic
debuggers complemented with distributed watchpoints and breakpoints. To
enable reasoning about high-level distributed conditions and actions, Friday
further allows programmers to view and manipulate system state at any replayed
node using arbitrary python commands.

5.1

Overview

Deterministic Replay: In Friday, liblog [10] is leveraged to deterministically and consistently replay the execution of a distributed application. To
achieve this, each application should records all non-deterministic system calls,
messages, and node failures to a local log. These logged information will be
sufficient to replay the execution following the same code path.
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3

Design

Friday presents to users a central debugging console,
which is connected to replay processes, each of which

for the variable srv.successor located at node 4. Similarly, breakpoints are
also extended. Programmers can install breakpoints on one, several or all replayed nodes.
Distributed watchpoints and breakpoints are implemented by setting local instances on each replay process and mapping their addresses to a global
identifier. While distributed breakpoints are implemented directly based on
GDB breakpoints, in contrast, Friday implements its own mechanism for local
watchpoints. The memory page that maintains the watched variable is set to
write-protected. When the variable is updated, the ensuing SEGV signal is
intercepted, leading Friday to unprotect the memory page and complete the
update.
5.1.2

Command Support

Another crucial feature of Friday is the ability to view and manipulate the
distributed state of replayed application using python commands in an interactive or automated manner. Interactive commands are passed directly to the
debugger processes, whereas automated commands are triggered by watchpoints
or breakpoints.
In particular, the commands may involve four types of system state: 1)
Friday’s own debugging state, for gathering statistics or modeling global application state; 2) state inside replay processes, for access to the state of the target
system; 3) the metavariable that maintains the node ID where a watchpoint or
breakpoint is triggered; and 4) the logical time kept by the Lamport clock or
real time recorded in logs.
watch srv.successor
command
if srv.node.addr !=
@nodesbyID[srv.successor](srv.predecessor) :
print "Node srv.node.addrs succesor "
"link is not symmetric."
end
watch srv.predecessor
command
if srv.node.addr !=
@nodesByID[srv.predecessor](srv.successor) :
print "Node srv.node.addrs predecessor "
"link is not symmetric."
end
Figure 6: Commands for Checking Whether a Chord Ring is Well-formed
As an example, the two sets of commands shown in Figure 6 define a highlevel distributed property, namely a Chord should be well-formed, by checking
two conditions: (1) each node should be the predecessor of its successor; and
(2) each node should be the successor of its predecessor.
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5.2

Evaluation

According to the taxonomy presented in Section 3. Friday adopts deterministic replay for fault diagnosis. We summarize the strength and limitation of
Friday of follows:
Strengths:
• Friday is the first replay-based debugging system for unmodified distributed
applications at the fine granularity of source symbols. In addition, it provides the ability to write arbitrary commands in an interactive or automated approach for tracking high-level distributed conditions and actions.
• The replay-based nature of Friday allows programmers to refine checks
after repeated replays without recompilation and fresh log extractions.
Programmers can dynamically select the system state to be monitored at
runtime of the replay.
Limitations:
• Friday has large storage requirement for logs, since all non-deterministic
events need to be recorded. The increase in the complexity of target
systems and their scales will lead to significant increase of the log size.
Furthermore, the logs are collected at a centralized location, the aggregate
size of the logs could be prohibitively large.
• Performing replay starting from an intermediate state is not supported.
Friday have to replay the application from the beginning. This limitation might be addressed by introducing static snapshot of the application.
However, defining snapshot of an application is difficult by itself for complex systems.
• The deterministic replay is performed at a centralized location, which requires all information to be transmitted to that node. In addition, centralized replay also demands significant amount of CPU, memory and storage
resources, leading to limits on the scalability.

6

PeerReview: Practical Accountability for Distributed Systems

Pip and Friday manage faults derived from bugs in software design or implementation, where the runtime environment is assumed to be completely trusted.
In contrary, PeerReview is deployed in an untrusted environment, and focuses
on faults caused by malicious behaviors from compromised nodes.
PeerReview provides accountability in distributed systems. It maintains a
tamper-evident record that provides irrefutable evidence for all nodes’ actions.
Based on the logs, PeerReview ensures that an observable fault is eventually
detected and that a correct node can defend itself against any false accusations.
PeerReview is widely applicable to various applications, ranging from detecting unexpected in interdomain routing [11], developing secure network coordinates [25], to auditing P2P distributed virtual environments.
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6.1

Overview

System Model: In PeerReview, each node i is modeled as a deterministic state
machine Si , a detector module Di and an application Ai , as shown in Figure 7.
The state machine Si represents the behaviors that need to be checked; whereas
the application Ai represents the other functionalities, and the detector Di
implements PeerReview.
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sequence. The elements of the sequence up to a given point can be proved to
be correctly generated, while future values remains unpredictable.
One of the most frequently used operation in PeerReview is the access and
modification of the tamper-evident log. [7] introduces tree-based tamper-evident
logs to improve the efficiency of appending and querying log entries.

6.2

Evaluation

Strengths:
• Unlike Pip and Friday which handle faults derived from software errors,
PeerReview targets on general Byzantine faults including those resulting
from malicious behavior by compromised nodes. PeerReview provides a
approach to make strong guarantees on eventual Byzantine fault detection.
• PeerReview provides general and practical accountability. Most of the
assumptions made in PeerReview are realistic and easy to met. With
little presumption on the target system, it is generally applicable to a
wide range of protocols, e.g., network filesystems, peer-to-peer system
and overlay multicast systems.
Limitations:
• PeerReview assumes the availability of the reference implementation of
all other nodes, which may not be necessarily true. In addition, as a
performance optimization (See Section 6.1.3), PeerReview also assumes
reference implementations can be initialized to an arbitrary intermediate
snapshot of system state. As discussed in Section 5.2, this process is nontrivial or may not be feasible for all target systems.
• As described in Section 6.1.1, to prevent inconsistent logs, when a node
i receives a message from another node j, each of the i’s witness needs
to forward the message to all the witnesses of j. The complexity of this
process is roughly O(W 2 ), where W is the average size of the witness sets.
This may limit the scalability of PeerReview. We note that PeerReview
has introduced probabilistic guarantees to mitigate this problem, which
proves to be notably effective.

7

TrInc: Trusted Hardware against Equivocation

Performed in an untrusted environment, PeerReview employs several mechanisms to ensure the integrity of logs. One of them (the consistency protocol)
is used to prevent nodes sending inconsistent logs to other nodes. In general,
making inconsistent statements (e.g. logs in the case of PeerReview) to others
is known as equivocation. Consisting fundamentally of only a non-decreasing
counter and a key, TrInc (trusted incrementer) provides a new primitive –
unique, once-in-a-lifetime attestations to combating equivocations.
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7.1

Overview

Equivocation: Equivocation is a necessary property for Byzantine faults and
many other forms of fraud is equivocation. A common approach to prevent
equivocation requires communication with each other or with a third party [12,
13], so they can learn about all the distinct statements. However, this additional
communication can become bottleneck for P2P systems, as we discussed in
Section 6.1.1. TrInc minimizes both communication overhead and the number
of non-faulty nodes required. In addition, it is designed to be small, simple and
cheap for deployment in distributed systems.
Architectural Overview: TrInc introduces trinket a trusted hardware to generate and verify attestations. For each data m, an attestation is attached, which
binds m to a certain value of a counter, and ensures no other data will be bound
to the same value.
7.1.1

TrInc State

Figure 9 describes the state of a trinket. Each trinket is bound to a unique
identifier I and a public/private key pair (Kpub , Kpriv ), which are configured by
its manufacturer. An attestation A is also provided to prove the validity of the
trinket. These four state are permanently maintain in the trinket.
A trinket may include several counters; a meta-variable M maintains the
number of the counters. Another global state is Q, a limited-size FIFO queue
that contains the most recently generated counter attestations. When encountered a power failure, a trinket uses Q to recover its state.
A final part of a trinket’s state is an array of counters, each of which maintains three state, i.e. the identifier of the counter i, the current value of the
counter c, and the key to use for attestations K.

y improves its performance over using asymmetric
ography or even secure hashes. To ensure that parnts cannot generate arbitrary attestations, the symc key is stored in trusted memory, so that users canead it directly. Symmetric keys are shared among
ets using a mechanism that ensures they will not be
sed to untrusted parties.

Notation

e use the notation xK to mean an attestation of x
ould only be produced by an entity knowing K. If
a symmetric key, then this attestation can be verified
by entities that know K; if K is a private key, then
ttestation can be verified by anyone, or more accuy anyone who knows the corresponding public key.
se the notation {x}K to mean the value x encrypted
public key K, so that it can only be decrypted by
es knowing the corresponding private key.

TrInc state

gure 1 describes the full internal state of a trinket,
h we describe in more detail here. Each trinket is
wed by its manufacturer with a unique identity I and
lic/private key pair (Kpub , Kpriv ). Typically, I will
e hash of Kpub . The manufacturer also includes in
inket an attestation A that proves the values I and
belong to a valid trusted trinket, and therefore that
orresponding private key is unknown to untrusted
es.
e leave open the question of what form A will take.
attestation is meant to be evaluated by users, not by
ets, and so can be of various forms. For instance,
ght be a certificate chain leading to a well-known
rity trusted to oversee trinket production and ensure
secrets are well kept.
other element of the trinket’s state is the meta-

Notation
Kpriv
Kpub
I
A
M
Q

Notation
i
c
K

Global state:
Meaning
Unique private key of this trinket
Public key corresponding to Kpriv
ID of this trinket, the hash of Kpub
Attestation of this trinket’s validity
Meta-counter: the number of counters
this trinket has created so far
Limited-size FIFO queue containing the
most recent few counter attestations generated by this trinket
Per-counter state:
Meaning
Identity of this counter, i.e., the value of
M when it was created
Current value of the counter (starts at 0,
monotonically non-decreasing)
Key to use for attestations, or 0 if Kpriv
should be used instead
Figure 1: State of a trinket

Figure 9: State of a trinket

3.5 TrInc API

Figure 2 shows the full API of a trinket, described in
more detail in this subsection.
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3.5.1 Generating attestations
The core of TrInc’s API is Attest. Attest takes
three parameters: i, c , and h. Here, i is the identity of
a counter to use, c is the requested new value for that
counter, and h is a hash of the message m to which the
user wishes to bind the counter value. Attest works as
follows:

Algorithm 1 Attest(i, c , h, n)

7.1.2

TrInc Operations

Generating Attestation: The core of TrInc’s operations is Attest, which
takes three parameters: i, c0 , and h. Here i is the identifier of the counter; c0 is
the requested new value for that counter; and h is a hash of the message m to
which the user wishes to bind the counter value.
Since the counter is meant to be non-decreasing, Attest first examines the
validity of the requested new value, by check whether it is not smaller than
the current value of the counter, i.e. c ≤ c0 . If the new value is valid, the
attestation a is generated as a ← hI, i, c, c0 , hiK , where hXiK indicates using
key K to encrypt the content X. Then the value of the counter is updated to
c0 . Attest finishes by returning the generated attestation a.
Verifying Attestation: To verify an attestation a = hI, i, c, c0 , hiK , a trinket
verifies the authenticity of a with the corresponding key. If the attestation is
signed using asymmetric cryptographic scheme, the corresponding public key
is used; otherwise, for symmetric cryptographic scheme, the symmetric key K
should be exchanged aprioi and is used to verify the authenticity of a.

7.2

Applications

Trusted Logs with TrInc: A trusted log are maintained by augmenting an
append-only list of logs with an attestation attached to each of the log entries.
When a log entry e with a sequence number s is to be appended, an attestation
a is generated as a = Attest(i, s, h(e)), where i is the identifier of the trinket.
The triplet (s, e, a) is appended to the end of the log. Given a trusted log, any
trinket can check whether it is tampered, by verifying the attestations attached
to the log entries. Without knowing the key of the counter, it is practically
impossible for a malicious user/node to tamper log entries without being noticed.
In addition, when users lookup for the log entry with a particular sequence
number s, only one log entry may match s, thus equivocation is protected.
Simplifying PeerReview with TrInc: As described above, TrInc can easily
supply a trust log without the assistance of a witness set. TrInc-augmented
PeerReview includes such trusted logs. Whenever a message is sent or received,
the node should log that message with an attestation from its trinket. On the
receiving end, a node only processes a received message if it is accompanied by
an attestation that the message has been logged by the sender’s trinket.
Enabled with TrInc, PeerReview nodes no longer need to verify a hash chain
of log entries. The fact that TrInc signs the messages is sufficient. Furthermore, the expensive consistency protocol for preventing equivocations can also
be removed. In PeerReview, if a node i sends an authenticator to another node
j, then j’s witnesses should forward it to i’s witnesses. This is not necessary
in TrInc-augmented PeerReview, because equivocation is make impossible by
using the TrInc-enabled trusted log. Therefore, the communication overhead is
significantly reduced.

7.3

Evaluation

Strengths:
• Fundamentally, TrInc consists only of a non-decreasing counter and a key.
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The small size and simple semantics make it easy to deploy, as demonstrated by implementing it on currently available trusted hardware.
• With TrInc eliminating equivocations, a wide range of applications can
be significantly simplified. For instance, the heavy consistency protocol
used in PeerReview is avoided, which results in a significant reduction in
communication overhead. Without the power of equivocation, the number
of participants to tolerate f Byzantine faults is reduced from 3f + 1 to
2f + 1.
Limitations:
• There lacks a suitable trusted hardware to deploy TrInc. Though the
core functional elements of TrInc are included in the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM), it proves TPM is not a good option for deploying TrInc.
TrInc uses the trusted hardware in a fundamentally different way than
what these hardware are designed for. While the trusted hardware are designed to perform few operations during a machine’s boot cycle, TrInc uses
them much more frequently during operation. The limited performance
of trusted hardware results in significant overhead.

8

Discussion

In this section, we conclude our survey paper with comparisons of the different techniques proposed for fault management of distributed systems, followed
by a discussion of the challenges.

8.1

Comparison

In previous sections, we have discussed representative mechanisms and systems for fault management of distributed systems, including Pip in Section 4,
Friday in Section 5, PeerReview in Section 6 and TrInc in Section 7. These
systems, together with the taxonomy presented in Section 3, show that programmers indeed have a variety of options for fault detection, fault diagnosis,
and evidence generation.
Incorporated with the evaluations of individual systems presented in previous
sections, we present a comparison of the different techniques for fault detection
and fault diagnosis. We omit the comparison of the techniques proposed for
evidence generation, as these techniques are applied to disjoining application
domains, rendering the comparison less interesting.
8.1.1

Comparison of Fault Detection Techniques

• Invariant Checking: For invariant checking, programmers are allowed
to specify the system state to be exposed, thus they have the ability to
control of the size of logs. On the other hand, due to this configuration
is performed aprioi, prior knowledge of the target system is presumed. In
addition, improper settings may leads to false positives and false negatives.
Though Pip is not suitable for checking high-level distributed properties,
invariant checking, in general, is a promising technique for this purpose.
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• Reference Implementation: Fault detection with reference implementation is straightforward and easy to use. However, this approach is limited
to detecting faults resulting from malicious behaviors. For software error,
it might be difficult to obtain a reference implementation that operates
fully correct.
• Model Checking: Invariant checking and reference implementation only
detect faults existed in running executions, yet cannot guarantee the correctness of a system in all possible execution paths. Model checking performs more comprehensive detections using exhaustive search. In addition,
leveraged by heuristic random walk, model checking is applicable to detect
liveness faults with high confidence.
State explosion problem, though may be mitigated by adopting optimizations and random walk, is a daunting problem of model checking. In
addition, the difficulty in developing the state machine of a given system
raises barrier to the wide application of model checking.
8.1.2

Comparison of Fault Diagnosis Techniques

• Log-based Causality Analysis: While log-based causality analysis
requires less comprehensive logs than deterministic replay, the flexibility
of diagnosis is limited by the comprehensiveness of the logs. If a certain
system state needed for diagnosis is not logged, it can only be acquired
by refining the specification of the state to be exposed and rerunning the
target system.
• Deterministic Replay: Unlike log-based causality analysis, programmers are essentially able to acquire any system state during the replay.
Thus programmers can refine checks after repeated replays without recompilation and refresh log extraction.
The drawback of deterministic replay is also obvious. The logs for enabling deterministic replay are usually significantly large. Therefore, it
is expensive in terms of CPU, memory and storage resources to maintain
logs and perform replays.
• Statistical Inference: Based on machine learning techniques such as
clustering, statistical inference inevitably encounters false positive and
false negatives. Thus, careful balancing between them is required.

8.2

Challenges

• Usability: The first challenge involves improving the usability of fault
management, specifically, in the following three aspects: (1) allowing
mechanisms to be applied to application written in arbitrary language
(unlike MaceMC, WiDS and P2Monitor that require target system to be
based on Mace, WiDS and NDlog respectively); (2) enabling fault management without manual modification of source code (unlike Pip and XTrace
that inject annotations to source code); and (3) allowing users to specify
expectation of system behavior in more approachable means.
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• Reasoning about Time: The second challenge resides in improving the
ability of system operators to reason about time, e.g. optimizing virtual
clocks to trace real time more closely even when the distributed clocks
are poorly synchronized. This could be helpful to reason about properties
related concurrency and race conditions.
• Utilization of Distributed Resources: Most detection and diagnosis
mechanisms adopt centralized approaches. For instance, Pip gathers trace
files to a central location, where the reconciled path instances are maintained at a centralized database; Friday performs replay at a centralized
node; model checking systems, MaceMC and MODIST, steer systems locally. To leverage better utilization of distributed resources, programmers
may face a series of challenges, including consistency maintenance and
failure handling in parallel analysis (e.g. DS3) and distributed replay.
• Impact Analysis and Repair: Given detected faults, and their root
causes, a challenging research topic is how to accurately estimate their
impact on the current system, and how to repair the system online without
recompilation and rerun. As an alternative approach to minimize the
impact of faults on a running system, a recent work [26] explores model
checking techniques to predict possible system state in the future and steer
systems to avoid faults.
• Trusted Hardware Design: A2M [6] and TrInc [16] explore a novel
direction to implement Byzantine fault tolerance or detection system, by
adopting the support of trusted hardware. However, today’s trusted hardware is designed mainly for bootstraping software, which has few performance requirements. Developing high-performance trusted hardware that
are more suitable for distributed systems is a valuable area for future work.
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